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IS THIS REALLY
NECESSARY?

The Seminal Regulatory Issue
of the '90s:
Media Regulation and Competition
In 1988, this author asked the television cable company in Riverside County
to hook up to a home in its service area.
The houses on either side were served.
The company refused, explaining that it
could accommodate only a certain number of houses and had "no room" on its
system for the foreseeable future. The
company has no competitor and has a
lock on the county's business for the
next twenty years.
In 1989, this author's parents asked
Viacom Cablevision Company-the exclusive cable television franchisee in San
Francisco-to hook up to all of the
units in their cooperative apartment building. Viacom has the franchise until the
year 2010. Viacom sent a letter to the
coop, noting that it wanted 24-hour access to the cable wiring in the building
and demanding a key. The resident manager explained that she is in the premises
at all times and is available to escort
any workers who need access to the
building. Many senior citizens-one of
whom is 100 years old-reside in this
coop, and the building is in a high crime
area. The key to the building is zealously protected and has never been distributed to anyone other than a single key
to each resident. Viacom responded on
September I, 1989 with the following
letter to all residents: "Viacom Cablevision of San Francisco regrets to inform
you that as of September 18, 1989, service to the above address will be terminated."
Nothing in the franchise agreement
between the City and Viacom allows the
company unfettered access to homes and
apartments. But it does have a monopolyfor 21 years. And there is no alternative
to abject compliance with any demand
which might be made-apart from highly
expensive and problematical litigation.
Either comply with the demand-no matter what it is, or the service will be
denied or taken away. The coop surrendered its keys.
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These two personal anecdotes illustrate the verity of one of the most cliched
aphorisms in the English language: "power
corrupts, and absolute power corrupts
absolutely." If one wishes to examine
the price of monopoly power abuse, survey the food provided at the nation's
airports. Examine its quality, the speed
of service, the price. That is monopoly.
Monopoly is like having to buy your
hamburgers at the DMV. Monopoly is
the ultimate totalitarian state. What difference does it make if you :iave political
freedom to write letters to the editor if
there is only one editor to send them to?
The most troubling economic and
political issue facing the citizens of this
nation in the 1990s is the future of our
media. From the media we get almost
all of our information-political and
economic. He or she who controls it
controls us.

Cable Monopoly
Several alarming trends in the communications industry portend threats to
the information pluralism which underlies our basic freedoms. The first is the
growing unchecked economic power of
the cable television systems. In 1980,
20% of California homes were on cable;
now, most of California's homes receive
their television reception from cable.
Notwithstanding City of Los Angeles
v. Preferred Communications, 1 which
declared a theoretical first amendment
interest in all~wing more than one cable
franchise, over 95% of all current subscribers have a single option-one monopoly power cable carrier with, effectively, an exclusive franchise granted by
local government. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 19842 was a compromise between the National Cable
Television Association and the National
League of Cities. The Senate irresponsibly bought the argument that there should
be no common carrier regulation because
cable service is "not essential" and "not
a natural monopoly." The FCC compounded this absurdity by finding that rate
review is not needed where there is effect-
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ive competition, and that there is effective competition if a community has four
or more over-the-air stations which reach
the community. In 1987, the FCC reduced that required number to three. Of
course, they all arrive in homes by the
grace of the cable carrier. There is no
federal rate regulation. No state regulation either; nor does the state require
even local rate regulation. The statute
allows exclusive franchises to be granted
by counties and cities-these franchises
then operate as unfettered monopolies.
Even if amending legislation were to
correct this defect, local governments
currently collect a "franchise fee" for
themselves based on a percentage of
gross revenues. Local governments are
not about to compromise this source of
income based directly on the revenues
created by their franchisee. The higher
the charge, the more they get. California
franchise fees for local governments will
exceed $50 million this year. No city or
county seriously reviews rates in terms
of a fair rate of return, as is required of
other natural monopolies, nor at all.
In terms of non-price regulation, the
Act also gave substantial discretion to
the cable operator to determine which
stations will be carried and how access
will be arranged. In fact, the statute
specifically provides that "a city may
deny a franchise renewal...but may not
take into account the mix, quality or
level of cable services or other services. "3
Nor does the state. Nor does the FCC.
Court decisions have generally prohibited states from setting up monopolies
or restraining trade. Federal antitrust
law is paramount to state law under the
supremacy clause of the Constitution;
the states may restrain trade only if they
do two things: (I) specifically authorize
the restraint by law; (2) engage in active
and independent state supervision to substitute for the absent marketplace. The
requirement of independent state supervision is still in flux, but under cases
like Hudson v. City of Chula Vista, 4 it is
working out to mean no supervision
over prices if cities are even theoretically
involved.
The exclusive franchises are commonly granted for ten to fifteen years; some
are for thirty years-that's until the year
2020. There is very little competitive
bidding. Rates vary between areas by
more than 100% for basic services ia
neighboring communities of similar size.
Rates have been increasing annually at
three times the rate of inflation or costs,
and profits are soaring. Revenues now
exceed one billion dollars per year.
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One of the advantages of the excessive profits of an unchecked monopolist
is its ability to funnel large sums for
political influence to assure the survival
of its monopoly. The California Cable
Television Association has channeled
over $400,000 into campaign contributions since 1985, giving to 117 of the
current 120 state legislators, in addition
to the usual personal "honoraria" to
legislators. Brown and Roberti have been
particular beneficiaries. In 1988, the industry won passage of AB 1802 (Hill),
allowing it to avoid property taxes on
its right-of-way assets. The bill allows
the industry to deduct these taxes straight
from the franchise fees it pays local
governments.
The most extreme example of this
confluence of corruptive economic and
political power heretofore has been the
insurance industry. Exempt from antitrust law, the industry raised over $60
million for its largely deceptive 1988
political proposition campaigns. To understand the scale here, one must realize
that this is more than either the Democratic or Republican parties spent on
the 1988 national presidential campaignapparently the most ever spent on a
political campaign in American history.
The insurance companies raised this
money by agreeing collusively to an
assessment of 1% on all California premiums. In other words, they fixed the
price $60 million higher by a direct rate
increase agreement passed on through
to us. Maybe we got off easy; the figure
could have been $100 million or $250
million-and nobody would have stopped them.
This same dangerous juxtaposition
exists vis-a-vis cable television. Except it
is more ominous, because it involves
communications and a structure even
more dangerous than the voluntary cartel-monopoly.
We have a traditional American
model, and it goes like this: you compete in an open marketplace or you are
subject to regulation. If you have a monopoly, you get at least maximum price
review based on a fair rate of return
standard, and you do not take your
political money from the ratepayers but
from the stockholders' profits-they are
the ones who both control and benefit
from your political spending.

Media Concentration
The second trend is related: the increasing concentration of media ownership in fewer hands. Let's start where we
left off-with the cable systems-now

called "MSOs" or "multiple system operators" in the economic literature. The
last five years have seen a startling increase in that concentration, with merger
mania unabated by a moribund Department of Justice. We have theoretical
FCC limitations on co-located (i.e.,
located in the same city) broadcast stations and newspapers and on broadcast
stations and cable operators. But the
Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984 5 did an interesting thing: it left out
any limitations at all on newspaper-cable
television co-located common ownership.
And this combination is by far the most
dangerous in the long run. Once a community has one major newspaper and it
then controls the cable system as well,
the fact that there are two or three overthe-air television stations reaching the
community (usually through the cable
system) may be small consolation.
In 1975, the FCC promised to revisit
the issue of cable-newspaper cross-ownership-but then ruled that "Section 613
of the Cable Act did not specifically
give to the Commission the authority to
impose such an ownership restriction.
Therefore, this proceeding is terminated. "6 Many commentators disagree
with this legal analysis. Professor
McGregor of Indiana University at Bloomington breaches normally diplomatic
scholarly etiquette in writing: "The FCC
reasoning is specious and perhaps even
consciously dishonest. ''7
The 1984 Act did one other thing
which makes the FCC's abdication from
newspaper-cable limitation especially
damaging: it prohibits local governments
from even considering newspaper crossownership in granting or renewing a
cable franchise.s The FCC preempts
local governments on this question, and
then abandons the field.
This license is contrary to the basic
antitrust concepts which preserve our
economic liberty, and it acts in the one
industry where a lack of marketplace
choice may affect our political liberty as
well. Where a small number of private
entities serve as possible choke points to
our access to each other and ba~ic social/
political information, our democratic
pluralism is in jeopardy. One actor in
control of these powerful sources of information, with the power to select programs and stations, and able to hire and
fire journalists, can very much influence
what we know and think politically. Information is power; its control is more
telling over the long run than economic
or even military power.
I am not arguing that we have a
total information monopoly in our major

c1t1es. We still have some measure of
diversity; in fact, to the extent cable
access is afforded to more groups, we
may have more diversity of opinion. But
the mechanism for the choking of information access, and indeed information
domination by a very few decisionmakers, is now in place-and what is
there to block it? The restraint of the
enterprise? A tradition of not interfering
in program content? Is that what we
want to rely upon as a society? On what
basis do we permit any cross-ownership
control between radio, over-the-air television, cable television, and newspapers?
What do we gain in allowing these combines? What do we lose?
Exacerbating this problem is the growing concentration not only between types
of media enterprises, but within newspapers, entertainment, and cable systems,
respectively. Economists call a "shared
monopoly" an "oligopoly." We regrettably have an oligopoly, at best, in those
controlling the provision of basic information in our major cities. The Newspaper Preservation Act 9 provided an
inexplicably easy standard for declaring
a newspaper "failing" to facilitate these
unfortunate and often economically unnecessary mergers. Economies of scale
justifying these mergers could have as
easily been provided by joint printing
agreements without combined ownership.
The Indiana Law Journal concluded in
1971: "The NPA will not serve the public's interest...[it] will insure the effective
monopolization of the newspaper business in the twenty-two cities where newspapers are participating in joint operations. This monopolization is likely to
effectively cripple the growth of small
newspapers and prevent the establishment of new competing dailies in these
communities. " 10
The 1971 critique has proved correct.
Now, single newspaper companies dominate each of almost all of our nation's
cities. Robert Picard, editor of the Journal of Economics, wrote recently: "Since
1970, more than 200 newspapers have
ceased operation. Only five have been
"saved" by the act, and one of those
repudiated its agreement and has again
begun operating independently.... When
the [joint operating agreements under
the NPA] expire, the dominant paper
can refuse to renew the agreement and
the smaller paper will fold .... Of the 20
JOAs currently in operation, the majority
will expire in the 1990s and ... seven or
eight... can be expected not to be renewed. "11
There is nothing wrong with a joint
operating agreement to save a failing
newspaper and preserve two separate
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voices in a community, but the Act went
way beyond that and allows price-fixing,
profit pooling, and market allocationpowers which should never be granted
without public review to preclude abuse,
which do not relate to the reason for the
Act, and which are allowed in no other
industry in America outside of cable
television, trash hauling, and-except for
California as of November 8, 1988insurance.
The percentage of daily newspaper
towns served by competing dailies has
declined from 60% in 1910, to 21% in
1930, to under 4% today. Not only has
concentration increased among newspapers but chains have evolved, raising
information control concerns beyond
individual cities and extending to entire
regions. Sixty-three million daily newspapers are printed and distributed in the
United States: the largest ten companies
controlled a shockingly high 37% of the
total market in 1980; and as of 1987,
that number was 43%. I predict that it
will approach 50% by 1992.
Finally, newspapers are merging with
multi-media enterprises-including news
magazines, movie production, and cable
television. We just saw the merger of
Time Inc. (which owns Fortune, Sports
Illustrated, and the ubiquitous People
magazine) with Warner Communications
Inc. (which includes Warner Brothers,
Lorimar, HBO, Cinemax, and Warner
Cable Communications)-creating a $15
billion megamedia company. The first
divisions ordered united were Time's
American Television & Communications
and Warner Cable Communications.
Of course, CBS Records has been
bought by Japan's Sony. Germany's
Bertelsmann has bought RCA and Doubleday Publishing. Britain's Robert Maxwell
bought MacMillan. Australian Rupert
Murdoch bought Twentieth Century Fox,
including Fox Television, Harper &
Rowe, and Triangle Publications (which
publishes TV Guide). And he bought
seven TV stations to boot. Recently, he
announced plans to raise $1 billion to
add new media properties to his newspaper, magazine, TV, and movie holdings.
There is now talk of Coca-Cola selling Columbia Pictures to America's biggest cable operator, Tele-Communications
Inc. (TCI). And of Gulf & Western (which
owns Paramount) merging with MCA.
And we have a group called the "Freedom of Expression Foundation" lobbying hard in Washington to repeal what
little is left of the cross-ownership rules.
Let the newspapers in a town control
the over-the-air stations as well. The
Foundation is funded by the Atlanta
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Journal and Constitution, Chicago
Tribune, Gannett Foundation, Newhouse
Foundation, Scripps Howard Broadcasting, and Times Mirror, among others.
Its goals have been endorsed, it claims,
by the American Newspaper Publishers
Foundation and the American Society
of Newspaper Editors.
The Freedom of Expression Foundation's literature describes its purpose as
follows: "Newspaper publishers are denied the right to acquire a broadcast
license in the same market solely because
of their ownership of non-broadcast mass
media facilities ... the rules force broadcaster and newspaper publisher to choose
only one medium of expression to employ in a given market and, as a consequence, restrict their freedom of
expression." Let's get this straight: the
Times Mirror is restricted in its freedom
of expression to several million newspapers each day and, of course, cable
holdings-but is deprived of control of
the major Los Angeles over-the-air television stations. Certainly the rest of us
feel that this first amendment limitation
is outrageous and that all of our information, or as much as possible, should
emanate from or through this single enlightened source.

Conclusion
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We can worry about the fairness of
elections in Nicaragua. We can worry
about the growing economic power of
Japan. We can worry about the corruptive influence of campaign contributions
on the American political system. We
can worry about a lot of things-and
with good reason. But this one has to be
at the top. Because if we lose this one,
we may lose control over the means of
correcting all of them. With concentration of ownership, local cable monopolies, and cross-ownership, our information can be channelled and choked from
the top. A system of pluralism and checks
and balances, of political democracy and
economic marketplace democracy, becomes very quickly something far different. And because terrible abuses which
may be soberly predicted flow from a
structure which does not set off immediate alarm bells, we might not know we
have lost this war until it has concluded.
The tragedy here comes not from a single
dramatic act which focuses our attention,
but from a structure which is now inexorably creeping into place. Where is
the American minuteman rushing to the
hearth for rifle in our common defense?
How much time do we have?
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